Fair point—I agree that the essay explicitly rejects the crude “Madhyamaka = passivity” dichotomy and acknowledges the demanding discipline of the bodhisattva path. My criticism is aimed at the deeper dichotomy that the essay introduces after making that qualification.
The essay says the real difference is “which way” the effort points: Buddhist effort ultimately points toward release, while Nietzschean effort points toward self-creation and intensification. But I think this still presupposes a particular understanding of what the self is.
My point isn't that Madhyamaka leaves no room for action, effort, cultivation or creation. It obviously does. The question is what is being cultivated or created. If it is a conventional configuration of drives, habits, dispositions and capacities, then we can describe that process without positing an independently existing self. But calling it “self-creation” risks retaining precisely the reification that Madhyamaka is trying to see through.
So I don't think the issue is whether someone exists who can “do something” after seeing through the self. Conventional persons act; Madhyamaka doesn't deny that. The issue is whether the absence of intrinsic selfhood becomes a licence to construct a more organised or intense self.
That is where I think the essay still hasn't quite engaged the Madhyamaka position I was pointing to. It moves from “there is no fixed self” to “therefore one can construct the self,” whereas Madhyamaka questions the assumption that there is a self there to be constructed in the first place.
So yes, the essay addresses the passivity objection. My objection is slightly deeper: I don't think it has yet resolved the question of what “self” means.
I find the essay provocative, and its contrast between Nietzsche and Madhyamaka is interesting. But I think it misses something more fundamental: it doesn’t quite understand what the “self” is that Madhyamaka is dissolving.
The essay seems to understand the self as a construction—a temporary organisation of drives, habits and forces. Hence the Nietzschean move: if the self is constructed, then construct it consciously, with greater intensity and organisation.
But Madhyamaka goes deeper than saying that the self is merely impermanent or constructed. The issue is the reification of a dependently arisen process into an independently existing “I.” The self isn't a temporary object that can first be dissolved and then rebuilt. The very assumption that there is a self there to dissolve, reconstruct, intensify or direct is what is being examined.
This is why the essay's “emptiness → choice → self-creation” framework doesn't quite work. Who is it that stands outside the dissolution and decides what to do with emptiness? If it is another configuration of drives, there is no autonomous self-creator; if it is an agent behind the drives, the substantial doer has simply returned.
The same problem appears in the essay's opposition between “syntropy” and “entropy,” or “life” and “death.” That is a Nietzschean valuation, not a consequence of seeing through the self. Madhyamaka does not require choosing between constructing the self and dissolving into passivity. Action can occur without a substantial actor; creation can occur without a permanent creator; letting go need not mean withdrawal.
So I think the essay makes a subtle but consequential substitution: it replaces the permanent self with an impermanent, self-organising self, and then treats the latter as what Buddhism has dissolved.
The deeper Madhyamaka point is not “there is no permanent self, so create yourself.” It is closer to: look carefully for the self that you imagine is there—and see that it cannot be found as an independently existing entity.
Once that is understood, the whole “get busy living or get lazy dying” dichotomy becomes much less compelling. It may be an interesting Nietzschean response to groundlessness, but it isn't an adequate account of what the Buddhist insight into selflessness entails.
And according to Madhyamaka Buddhism, who is going to look carefully for the non-existent self if there is no one to look? Such criticisms can be made of any philosophy that discusses the problem because the illusion arises through grammatical reifications, not just false theory - to speak of it at all is to speak in fictions.
Nietzsche's philosophy of language is well aware of this. The real divergence between Nietzsche and Buddhism is that he denies that Enlightenment or no-self can be realised, so self-construction is the only option we have. That being the case, people can only fake Enlightenment by living a death fantasy.
I think there may be a misunderstanding here about what Madhyamaka means by “no-self.” It does not say that there is literally nobody who can look, think, act, or investigate. It denies that, when we look carefully, we can find an independently existing self behind those processes.
So “who is looking?” already contains the assumption Madhyamaka is asking us to examine. There can be looking without an independently existing looker, just as there can be action without an independently existing doer. The person exists conventionally; what cannot be found is the intrinsic self we habitually project onto that person.
I agree that language inevitably operates through conventional designations and that grammatical structure can encourage reification. But that doesn't make the distinction disappear. Madhyamaka isn't trying to stop using “I”; it is trying to see through the assumption that the grammatical “I” corresponds to an independently existing entity.
This is also why I don't think the issue is simply whether Nietzsche believes enlightenment can be realised. My criticism of the essay is more basic: it seems to treat the self as a temporary configuration that, once recognised as non-permanent, can simply be reconstructed more deliberately. But that is not quite what Madhyamaka means by seeing through the self.
The question isn't merely whether the self is permanent or impermanent. It is what, exactly, is the self? If we cannot find an independently existing entity behind the aggregates, drives, thoughts and actions, then “constructing the self” remains a conventional description of organising those processes—it doesn't amount to constructing an actual self.
And I think that is where the essay's “get busy living or get lazy dying” dichotomy becomes problematic. It assumes that seeing through the self leaves us with a choice between dissolution and self-creation. Madhyamaka doesn't require either. Action can continue without a substantial actor; cultivation can continue without constructing an entity; and letting go need not mean passivity or death.
So I don't think the paradox is “who looks if there is no self?” The deeper point is precisely that the looking happens, while the independently existing looker cannot be found.
Fair point—I agree that the essay explicitly rejects the crude “Madhyamaka = passivity” dichotomy and acknowledges the demanding discipline of the bodhisattva path. My criticism is aimed at the deeper dichotomy that the essay introduces after making that qualification.
The essay says the real difference is “which way” the effort points: Buddhist effort ultimately points toward release, while Nietzschean effort points toward self-creation and intensification. But I think this still presupposes a particular understanding of what the self is.
My point isn't that Madhyamaka leaves no room for action, effort, cultivation or creation. It obviously does. The question is what is being cultivated or created. If it is a conventional configuration of drives, habits, dispositions and capacities, then we can describe that process without positing an independently existing self. But calling it “self-creation” risks retaining precisely the reification that Madhyamaka is trying to see through.
So I don't think the issue is whether someone exists who can “do something” after seeing through the self. Conventional persons act; Madhyamaka doesn't deny that. The issue is whether the absence of intrinsic selfhood becomes a licence to construct a more organised or intense self.
That is where I think the essay still hasn't quite engaged the Madhyamaka position I was pointing to. It moves from “there is no fixed self” to “therefore one can construct the self,” whereas Madhyamaka questions the assumption that there is a self there to be constructed in the first place.
So yes, the essay addresses the passivity objection. My objection is slightly deeper: I don't think it has yet resolved the question of what “self” means.
I find the essay provocative, and its contrast between Nietzsche and Madhyamaka is interesting. But I think it misses something more fundamental: it doesn’t quite understand what the “self” is that Madhyamaka is dissolving.
The essay seems to understand the self as a construction—a temporary organisation of drives, habits and forces. Hence the Nietzschean move: if the self is constructed, then construct it consciously, with greater intensity and organisation.
But Madhyamaka goes deeper than saying that the self is merely impermanent or constructed. The issue is the reification of a dependently arisen process into an independently existing “I.” The self isn't a temporary object that can first be dissolved and then rebuilt. The very assumption that there is a self there to dissolve, reconstruct, intensify or direct is what is being examined.
This is why the essay's “emptiness → choice → self-creation” framework doesn't quite work. Who is it that stands outside the dissolution and decides what to do with emptiness? If it is another configuration of drives, there is no autonomous self-creator; if it is an agent behind the drives, the substantial doer has simply returned.
The same problem appears in the essay's opposition between “syntropy” and “entropy,” or “life” and “death.” That is a Nietzschean valuation, not a consequence of seeing through the self. Madhyamaka does not require choosing between constructing the self and dissolving into passivity. Action can occur without a substantial actor; creation can occur without a permanent creator; letting go need not mean withdrawal.
So I think the essay makes a subtle but consequential substitution: it replaces the permanent self with an impermanent, self-organising self, and then treats the latter as what Buddhism has dissolved.
The deeper Madhyamaka point is not “there is no permanent self, so create yourself.” It is closer to: look carefully for the self that you imagine is there—and see that it cannot be found as an independently existing entity.
Once that is understood, the whole “get busy living or get lazy dying” dichotomy becomes much less compelling. It may be an interesting Nietzschean response to groundlessness, but it isn't an adequate account of what the Buddhist insight into selflessness entails.
And according to Madhyamaka Buddhism, who is going to look carefully for the non-existent self if there is no one to look? Such criticisms can be made of any philosophy that discusses the problem because the illusion arises through grammatical reifications, not just false theory - to speak of it at all is to speak in fictions.
Nietzsche's philosophy of language is well aware of this. The real divergence between Nietzsche and Buddhism is that he denies that Enlightenment or no-self can be realised, so self-construction is the only option we have. That being the case, people can only fake Enlightenment by living a death fantasy.
I think there may be a misunderstanding here about what Madhyamaka means by “no-self.” It does not say that there is literally nobody who can look, think, act, or investigate. It denies that, when we look carefully, we can find an independently existing self behind those processes.
So “who is looking?” already contains the assumption Madhyamaka is asking us to examine. There can be looking without an independently existing looker, just as there can be action without an independently existing doer. The person exists conventionally; what cannot be found is the intrinsic self we habitually project onto that person.
I agree that language inevitably operates through conventional designations and that grammatical structure can encourage reification. But that doesn't make the distinction disappear. Madhyamaka isn't trying to stop using “I”; it is trying to see through the assumption that the grammatical “I” corresponds to an independently existing entity.
This is also why I don't think the issue is simply whether Nietzsche believes enlightenment can be realised. My criticism of the essay is more basic: it seems to treat the self as a temporary configuration that, once recognised as non-permanent, can simply be reconstructed more deliberately. But that is not quite what Madhyamaka means by seeing through the self.
The question isn't merely whether the self is permanent or impermanent. It is what, exactly, is the self? If we cannot find an independently existing entity behind the aggregates, drives, thoughts and actions, then “constructing the self” remains a conventional description of organising those processes—it doesn't amount to constructing an actual self.
And I think that is where the essay's “get busy living or get lazy dying” dichotomy becomes problematic. It assumes that seeing through the self leaves us with a choice between dissolution and self-creation. Madhyamaka doesn't require either. Action can continue without a substantial actor; cultivation can continue without constructing an entity; and letting go need not mean passivity or death.
So I don't think the paradox is “who looks if there is no self?” The deeper point is precisely that the looking happens, while the independently existing looker cannot be found.
The essay explicitly raised the possibility of that false dichotomy and gave a response to it that your comments don't address.
It doesn’t have to be either, or. The dynamism of relationality is just that, the discernment of when to let go and when to construct.